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Abstract— Covert channels are used for the secret transfer
of information. Unlike encryption, which only protects the
information from unauthorised observers, covert channelsaim
to hide the very existence of the communication. The huge
amount of data and vast number of different network protocols
in the Internet makes it an ideal high-capacity vehicle for covert
communication. Covert channels pose a serious security threat
as they can be used for a number of malicious activities. In this
paper we present a novel covert channel inside the IP header’s
Time To Live (TTL) field. The sender manipulates the TTLs
of subsequent packets transmitting covert information to the
receiver. Since network elements along the path also modifythe
TTL, the capacity and stealth of this channel depend on the
“natural” TTL variation. We analyse this variation in multi ple
traffic traces and propose an encoding scheme, which makes the
TTL covert channel look similar to “natural” variation. We a lso
discuss methods to eliminate and detect this covert channel.
Index Terms— Security, Covert Channels, Network Protocols
I. I NTRODUCTION
Often it is thought that using encryption is sufficient to
secure communication. However, the simple fact that there
is communication is often enough to raise suspicion and take
further actions. While encryption is useful to protect informa-
tion from unauthorised observers, using covert channels aim to
hide the very existence of the communication. Covert channels
often use means of communication not normally intended to
be used, making the job of identifying them quite elusive.
Covert channels were introduced by Lampson in the context
of single hosts as a mechanism, by which a high security
process leaks information to a low security process that
would otherwise not have access to it [1]. While a serious
threat even for monolithic systems, the potential of covert
channels in computer networks is greatly increased. The hug
amount of data and vast number of different protocols in
the Internet makes it ideal as a high-capacity vehicle for
covert communications. In computer networks overt channels,
such as network protocols, are exploited as carriers for covert
information [2], [3]. Even if only one bit per packet can be
covertly transmitted, a large Internet site could lose 26GBof
data annually [4]. Furthermore, the covert channel capacity in
computer networks will further increase in the future due to
new high-speed network technologies.
Covert channels can be used for a number of purposes, some
posing serious security threats:
• Criminals, terrorists and intelligence agencies can use
covert channels for communication. Using only encryp-
tion would not prevent adversaries to detect communica-
tion patterns, which is often sufficient to detect the onset
of criminal activity, discover organisational structuresor
justify obtaining police warrants.
• Hackers that have compromised computer systems usu-
ally either ex-filtrate data or use the systems for malicious
purposes (such as launching Denial of Service attacks).
The generated network traffic – if not covert – would
alert system administrators, which then would discover
the compromised systems.
• Recent attempts by some governments to limit the free-
dom of speech and civilian use of (strong) cryptography
have lead to proposals for utilising covert channels to
circumvent these measures.
Covert channels in computer network protocols are similar to
techniques for hiding information in audio, visual or textual
content (steganography). While steganography requires some
form of content as cover, covert channels require some net-
work protocol as carrier. The ubiquitous presence of a small
number of network protocols suitable as carriers (e.g. the
Internet Protocol [5]) makes covert channels widely available
and usable even in situations where steganography cannot be
applied.
We propose a novel covert channel in the IP header’s Time
T Live (TTL) field [5]. Although this header field was never
intended to be used for communication, we demonstrate that
a covert sender can encode information in the TTL fields of
subsequent packets, which can be later decoded by a covert
receiver. However, since the TTL field of packets in flight
is modified by network devices (e.g. routers, firewalls) and
packets can traverse different paths from sender to receiver,
there is “natural” TTL variation.
The implications of this are twofold. Firstly, the encoding
f the covert channel should be chosen so that the covert
channel looks similar to “natural” TTL variation. Secondly,
the capacity of the covert channel depends on the “natural”
TTL variation (channel noise). We analyse TTL variation in
multiple traffic traces captured in the Internet and proposean
encoding scheme, which make the TTL covert channel look
similar to “natural” TTL variation.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II we describe
existing covert channels inside protocol header fields. In
section III we propose a covert channel in the IP TTL field
that looks similar to “natural” TTL variation and also discus
methods to eliminate and detect it. In section IV we analyse
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“natural” TTL variation from multiple traffic traces captured in
the Internet. Section V concludes and outlines future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Unused or reserved bits in packet headers, packet padding,
or various header fields can be used as covert channels. Handel
et al. proposed using the unused bits of the IP [5] Type of
Service (TOS) field , or of the TCP [6] flags field [7]. Ahsan et
al. introduced a technique where the IP Don’t Fragment (DF)
bit is used [8]. The DF bit can be set to arbitrary values if the
sender knows the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) of the path
to the receiver and only sends packets of less than MTU size. A
number of researchers proposed to hide covert data in padding,
if the standard does not enforce specific values [4], [7], [9].
For example, Ethernet pads frames to a minimum length of
60 bytes, and the IP and TCP header are padded to 4-byte
boundaries if header options are present. Fisk et al. proposed
transmitting covert data in TCP reset (RST) segments [4].
Segment with RST flag set abort the connection and usually
contain no data.
Popular header fields for inserting covert information are the
IP identification field and the TCP initial sequence number.
The IP Identification (ID) field is used to uniquely identify
IP packets for a certain time period, necessary to reassemble
fragmented packets [5]. Rowland proposed to multiply each
byte of covert information with 256 and use it as IP ID [10].
Ahsan et al. proposed to transmit covert information in the
high byte of the IP ID (as XOR of the data and a secret key)
and generate the low byte randomly [8].
TCP Sequence numbers are used to coordinate which data
has been transmitted and received to guarantee reliable trans-
port. The first sequence number selected by a client is called
the Initial Sequence Number (ISN). The ISN must be selected
carefully, so that sequence numbers of new incarnations do
not overlap with sequence numbers of earlier incarnations of
a connection [6]. Rowland proposed to multiply each covert
byte with 2563 and use it as ISN [10]. Murdoch et al.
pointed out that it is easy to detect covert channels if the
resulting value distribution differs from the normal distrbution
generated by real operating systems [11]. They developed ISN
covert channels tailored for Linux/OpenBSD, where the covert
channel distribution looks exactly like the normal distribution.
Giffin et al. developed a method for covert messaging
through TCP timestamp options, which are used by many
operating systems to improve TCP performance [12]. The
sender inserts covert information in the timestamps low order
bits, because these bits are effectively random for slow TCP
connections. The algorithm slows the TCP stream so that the
timestamps on packets are valid when they are sent.
Jones et al. proposed a covert channel in the IP TTL field
to trace back IP packets without using the source address
field (needed to effectively react to Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks). [13]. While Jones et al. channel is only used for
packet marking, Qu et al. have proposed a covert channel in
the IP TTL field usable for general communication [14].
However, the channel encoding proposed by Qu et al. does
not consider normal initial TTL values and “natural” TTL
variation occurring in the network, and is therefore easy to
detect. In this paper we we analyse “natural” TTL variation
and initial TTL values, and propose a TTL covert channel that
looks similar to a normal flow with “natural” TTL variation.
III. TTL C OVERT CHANNEL
In this section we first describe the covert channel com-
munication model, and then how the IP TTL field is used as
covert channel. Finally, we discuss methods to eliminate and
detect the TTL covert channel.
A. Communication Model
The de-facto standard covert channel communication model
is the prisoner problem introduced by Simmons [15]. Two
people, Alice and Bob1, are thrown into prison and intend to
escape. To agree on an escape plan they need to communicate,
but all their messages are monitored by Wendy the warden.
If Wendy finds any signs of suspicious messages Wendy will
place Alice and Bob into solitary confinement – making an
escape impossible. Alice and Bob must exchange innocu-
ous messages containing hidden information that, they hope,
Wendy will not notice. There are different types of wardens
[16]:
• A passive warden can only spy on the channel but cannot
alter any messages.
• An active warden is able to slightly modify the messages,
but without altering the semantic context.
• A malicious warden may alter the messages without
impunity, but in reality malicious wardens are rare [16].
Extending this scenario towards communication networks,
Alice and Bob are using two networked computers to commu-
nicate. They run some innocuous looking overt communication
between their computers, with a hidden covert channel. Alice
and Bob share a secret useful for determining covert channel
encoding parameters and for encrypting/authenticating the
hidden messages. For practical purposes Alice and Bob may
well be the same person, for example a hacker ex-filtrating
restricted information. Wendy manages the network and can
monitor the passing traffic for covert channels or alter the
passing traffic to eliminate or disrupt covert channels. Figure
1 depicts the communication model (Alice sending to Bob).
Fig. 1. The prisoner problem – model for covert channel communication
In computer networks Alice and Bob do not have to be
the sender and receiver of the overt communication. One or
1Cryptographic protocols are usually illustrated using participants named
alphabetically (Alice, Bob) or with names where the first leter matches their
role (Wendy the warden).
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both of them may act as a middleman. If Alice can observe
and manipulate an existing overt communication from an
innocent sender that reaches Bob, she can insert a covert
channel into it. Bob does not need to be the receiver of the
overt communication, but merely must be able of observing
it to decode the hidden information. If Bob can also alter the
overt communication, he can even remove the covert channel
preventing the receiver of the overt communication from
discovering it. A middleman could be located for example
inside a network router or inside an end host’s network stack.
B. Channel Encoding
The IP TTL header field limits the lifetime of an IP packet,
preventing packets from living forever during routing loops
[5]. A packet’s TTL is set by the sender and decremented by
each network element along the path processing the packet’s
IP header (e.g. routers and firewalls). Packets are discarded if
their TTL becomes zero while still in transit.
The covert sender cannot directly encode covert information
in the TTL field because using any other values apart from the
few normal initial TTLs [17], [18] would be highly suspicious,
and as a middleman it cannot drastically alter the TTL withou
the risk of packets indefinitely looping (TTL increase) or not
reaching their destination (TTL decrease). Encoding covert
information directly as TTL values would also require that
the covert receiver always knows how many hops the sender
is away. Since the number of hops can change at any time due
to routing changes this is impractical.
We propose to encode the covert information using two
symbols: low-TTL signals a 0-bit whereashigh-TTL signals
a 1-bit. Low- and high-TTL are two particular TTL values
chosen by the covert sender based on the overt flow. The
covert sender uses either the default initial TTL (if also the
overt sender) or the (lowest) TTL of the intercepted packets
(if a middleman) as high-TTL, and high-TTL minus one as
low-TTL. Decrementing the default TTL eliminates the risk
of packets stuck in routing loops, while it is still very likely
that packets reach their final destination. (Common operating
systems use initial TTL values of at least 64 and the number
of hops between two hosts of the Internet is generally assumed
to be smaller than 32 [17].)
The receiver observes a flow of packets with two different
TTL values, and will decode packets with the higher TTL as 1-
bit and packets with the lower TTL as 0-bit. Before the receiver
can start the decoding it needs to see both TTL values to
identify low-TTL and high-TTL. Therefore, the sender should
not send long sequences of zero or one bits at the start.
C. Channel Errors and Capacity
We found that “natural” TTL variation in packet flows
between senders and receivers is not very common, but
present in a significant amount of flows (see section IV). This
means that often a covert sender and receiver could expect
a channel without noise caused by “natural” TTL variation.
The current channel encoding only copes with slow “natural”
TTL variation, for example infrequent path changes. After a
path change the receiver will decode few bits incorrectly, but
assuming a mix of zero and one bits is sent, it will quickly
discover a TTL lower than low-TTL or higher than high-
TTL and can adapt its decoding accordingly. Another issue
is packet loss and reordering. TCP flows provide reliable in-
order delivery of packets, but UDP flows can experience packet
loss and reordering. To ensure a reliable transport, well-known
techniques such as error correcting codes or, segmentationand
retransmission could be used.
Without errors the capacity of the TTL covert channel is
one bit per packet of the overt channel. With packet rates of
up to hundreds of packets/second (see section IV-E) the bit
rate of the covert channel is up to hundreds of bits/second for
a single overt flow. Multiple overt flows could be utilised in
parallel to increase the capacity. A more comprehensive study
of channel errors, capacity and the development of a more
robust channel encoding is left for future work.
D. Elimination
All channels outlined in section II can be eliminated by
enforcing standard-conform header fields and padding, or by
rewriting header fields such as the IP ID, TCP ISN, and times-
tamps. In practice however, limited processing capabilities of
the active warden may prevent complete elimination.
To eliminate the TTL covert channel the warden needs to
s t the TTLs of all packets of a flow to the same value. The
warden should set the TTLs to a value equal to the smallest
TTL of the flow (thereby reducing larger TTLs) for the reasons
explained in section III-B. A warden that is not close to the
sender and therefore unable to manipulate all packets cannot
completely eliminate the channel, but would possibly reduce
t capacity because of the added “noise”.
E. Detection
All channels described in section II, except the undetectable
channel in [11], are fairly simple to detect, because they use
non-standard or invalid header field values or combinations,
or the resulting value distributions look abnormal. The TTL
channel is not undetectable, but is potentially harder to deect
than most previous channels. If the covert sender is also
the overt sender and the warden is only one hop away, any
observed TTL variation would indicate the presence of a covert
channel. However, if the covert sender is a middleman and/or
the warden is multiple hops away from the sender detection
is not that trivial.
The warden needs to differentiate between normal TTL
variation (see section IV) and the covert channel. We have
chosen the encoding of the channel so that the number of
TTLs (see section IV-C) and the TTL amplitude (see section
IV-D) appear normal. A high frequency of TTL changes is
s spicious, but the covert sender can sacrifice capacity to
improve stealth by reducing the change frequency (see section
IV-E). However, a warden could probably still detect the TTL
covert channel by a more in-depth analysis of the actual
change pattern and comparison with normal change patterns.
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IV. “N ATURAL” TTL V ARIATION IN THE INTERNET
In this section we investigate the “natural” TTL variation
occurring in Internet packet flows. Existing work focused on
TTL to study hop counts between Internet hosts on longer time
scales [19], [20]. In contrast, we study TTL changes within
short time scales of single traffic flows from one particular
viewpoint (capture device or covert receiver).
A. Datasets
We use three different packet traces as input: a trace
captured on a public game server at our lab in Melbourne
(CAIA), a trace captured on a public game server connected to
the Grangenet research network [21] in Canberra (Grangenet),
and a public trace captured at a 1Gbit/s aggregated uplink of
a student dorm Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL)
access network (Twente) [22].
The CAIA and Grangenet traces were continuously captured
from May 2005 to June 2006, and the Twente trace was
captured in July 2004 (we use only the first week). The CAIA
trace contains only game traffic, the Grangenet trace contains
game and web traffic, and the Twente trace contains a mix of
traffic (including web, peer-to-peer, game, email traffic).
We grouped packets into flows according to IP addresses,
port numbers and protocol. The end of a flow is determined
by the TCP connection teardown or a 600 second idle timeout
(whichever occurs first). Although we treat flows as bidirec-
tional for the TCP state tracking and flow timeout, we later
separate the two directions into unidirectional flows because
TTL variation can differ in either direction. In the following
the notion of flow is always unidirectional. For the CAIA and
Grangenet traces we have removed all flows originating from
the servers, because their TTL is constant (initial TTL). We
only consider flows with at least four packets and an average
packet rate of at least one packet/second (pps) because for
other flows the potential covert channel capacity is very low.
B. Number of Flows with TTL Changes
Table I shows the number of flows and bytes with/without
TTL changes, and the percentages of flows and bytes with
TTL changes. It also shows percentiles of the distribution of
estimated hop counts between sender and receiver. A small but
significant number of flows has packets with different TTL
values. This seems beneficial for the use of TTL as covert
channel: noise caused by “natural” TTL variation would be
uncommon, but flows with varying TTLs are not uncommon
enough to immediately suspect a covert channel. The CAIA
and Grangenet traces exhibit slightly larger TTL variation,
which is probably caused by larger average hop counts. In the
Twente trace ~50% of the flows have very small hop counts
because they originate from the ADSL clients.
C. Number of Different TTLs per Flow
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distributions of the number
of different TTL values in flows with varying TTL. In 92%
of CAIA and 99% of Grangenet and Twente flows, the TTL
changes only between two distinct values (please note the y-
axis limits). Therefore, a covert channel using more than two
distinct TTL values would be suspicious.
























Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of number of different TTLvalues per flow
D. Amplitude of TTL Changes
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distributions of the amplitude
of the TTL changes. We define the amplitude as the difference
between the minimum and maximum TTL values of a flow.
For 90% of the CAIA trace flows the amplitude is one. For
the Grangenet and Twente traces a large number of flows have
large amplitudes presumingly caused by firewalled TCP flows.
Modern firewalls send packets part of the TCP handshake
or teardown on behalf of clients (e.g. for SYN flood attack
protection). The TTLs in these packets are set to the initial
TTL of the firewall, which can differ from the initial TTL used
by the host behind the firewall. Different operating systemsuse
different initial TTLs, the most common being: 64 (Linux,
FreeBSD), 128 (Windows 98/XP), 255 (Cisco) [17], [18].
Therefore, the difference of the two TTLs will likely be 64,
127, or 191 plus/minus the distance between firewall and host.
We also plot the CDFs for Grangenet and Twente flows
untouched by firewalls (which look similar to that of the CAIA
trace). This means a covert channel using amplitudes other
than one would be suspicious.




























Fig. 3. Cumulative distributions of the amplitude of TTL changes per flow
E. Frequency of TTL Changes
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distributions of the average
frequency of TTL changes (excluding firewalled TCP flows).
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TABLE I









Estimated hop count percentiles
(1%, 25% 50%, 75%, 99%)
CAIA 128,617 2766 (2.1%) 114.5 GB 6.0 GB (5.0%) 7, 11, 14, 19, 26
Grangenet 282,898 8582 (2.9%) 28.1 GB 0.9 GB (3.1%) 5, 12, 15, 18, 26
Twente 1,354,585 24,603 (1.8%) 62.0 GB 1.8 GB (2.8%) 3, 3, 4, 11, 19
We define the average frequency of TTL changes as the num-
ber of TTL changes divided by the total number of consecutive
packet pairs. On average most flows only change TTL values
every 2-3 packet pairs or slower. A TTL covert channel cannot
change TTL values faster without being suspicious.
Multiplying the per-packet-pair change rates with the aver-
age packet rates of the flows, we find on average most flows
have at most 10-15 TTL value changes per second. The Twente
trace has higher frequencies, because its flows have packet
rates up to few 100pps, whereas in the CAIA and Grangenet
traces packet rates are only 20-30pps (characteristic for game
flows). This results in maximum channel capacities of up to
10-15bit/s for single overt flows.


























Fig. 4. Cumulative distributions of the frequency of TTL changes per flow
V. CONCLUSIONS ANDFUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a novel covert channel inside the
IP header’s Time To Live (TTL) field. We analysed the short-
term “natural” variation of TTLs in traffic flows based on real
traffic traces captured in the Internet. We found that a smallbut
significant number of flows experience TTL changes during
their lifetime, and we showed the main characteristics of these
TTL changes. The covert channel encoding was chosen so that
the covert channel looks similar to “natural” TTL variation
with regard to the analysed characteristics. Therefore, the TTL
covert channel is potentially harder to detect than many covert
channels proposed previously. The maximum capacity of the
channel is likely up to several 100bit/s (depending on the
overt channel used as carrier). We also have outlined suitable
techniques to eliminate and detect the TTL covert channel.
Future work will extend the analysis of “natural” TTL
variation towards a larger set of traffic traces and a more
in-depth study of the change patterns. We will also evaluate
the capacity of the TTL covert channel in the presence of
“natural” TTL variation and packet loss. Furthermore, we
will investigate how difficult it is to detect the channel with
anomaly detection methods. The ultimate goal is to develop
an improved channel encoding that is robust against “natural”
TTL variation and packet loss, while providing good stealth.
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